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Abstract: 
Background and Aim:  Minimum Unit Pricing (MUP) for alcohol was introduced in Scotland 
on 1 May 2018 and is now on the policy agenda in other devolved administrations and at 
Westminster. Previous research has explored the arguments deployed for and against MUP, 
but the congruence between actors in the MUP debate has not been sufficiently examined. 
This study identified and mapped the discourse coalitions that emerged in the UK MUP 
debate through an analysis of actors’ use of arguments in media coverage of the policy 
debates. 
Design: A sample of print media coverage of MUP was obtained from the LexisNexis 
newspaper database. The resulting sample was imported into discourse network analysis 
(DNA) software for coding and subsequent visualisation of actor networks. 
Setting: United Kingdom. 
Observations: 348 articles from eight UK-wide and three Scottish newspapers from an 18-
month period, ending in November 2012, were analysed. 
Measurements: Actors’ arguments were coded to generate structured data for conversion 
into a weighted actor network where ties represent similarities among actors in terms of 
arguments in support of or opposition to MUP. 
Findings: Two polarised discourse coalitions, Opponents and Proponents of MUP, emerged 
in media coverage.  The Proponents coalition consisted mainly of health advocacy groups, 
charities, political parties and academic institutions. In the Opponents coalition, the 
networks were formed of key alcohol manufacturers and economic think-tanks. Whilst 
producer organisations were central to the Opponents coalition, some commercial actors 
were more favourable to MUP highlighting divisions within the industry overall.  
Conclusions: Media coverage of Minimum Unit Pricing (MUP) in Scotland from June 2011 to 
November 2012 showed alignment between the policy positions of 1) alcohol producers 
and think-tanks opposed to MUP; and 2) public health advocates and health charities in 
favour of the policy. Some alcohol industry actors were supportive of MUP indicating 
divisions amongst the industry. Discourse network analysis may be usefully applied to study 
other highly contested policy issues in health and beyond. 
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Introduction 
Forms of minimum alcohol pricing have been in place across various Scandinavian countries and 
Canadian provinces for several years, offering governments an opportunity to both raise revenue 
and stabilise markets (1). The implementation of similar policies, with the explicit aim of reducing 
consumption and minimising health harms, has been widely debated since the Scottish Government 
announced its interest in Minimum Unit Pricing (MUP) for alcohol. Attracting international interest, 
the policy is now under consideration across various international contexts, including Ireland, 
Estonia (2) and Australia (3), as well as elsewhere in the UK. In these contexts, and across the UK, the 
impact of MUP is heavily anticipated. Following the UK Supreme Court ruling in November 2017 
against the Scotch Whisky Association’s challenge to the policy, MUP was introduced in Scotland on 
1st May 2018 (4). This internationally significant policy passed into law in Scotland in June 2012 (the 
Alcohol (Minimum Pricing) (Scotland) Act). At Westminster, the extension of the policy to England 
was shelved in 2013 with the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government citing a lack of 
evidence, it remains under review (5). In Wales, the Public Health (Minimum Price for Alcohol) 
(Wales) Bill was introduced to the National Assembly in October 2017 and in Northern Ireland the 
Department of Health have announced a consultation paper on MUP for consideration in 2018 (6). 
The progress of MUP has been highlighted as an illustration of the complexity of the policy process 
(7), with a range of factors determining the status and traction of the policy across political contexts 
(8, 9). 
Complex policy processes can be conceptualised as networks of political “actors” or stakeholders 
with an interest in the formation of a particular policy, that form coalitions in order to shape and 
influence policy debates (10, 11). The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) posits that actors with 
similar normative policy beliefs can be identified and that these entrenched coalitions compete 
about policy design over long time periods (12). Argumentative discourse analysis suggests that 
actors influence each other through arguments and position themselves at “particular sites of 
discursive production,” which are referred to as “discourse coalitions” (13). Exploring the discourses 
produced in a policy debate, the networks of actors that coalesce around particular assemblages of 
beliefs, and the discourse coalitions that emerge from debates provides insights into the complex 
process of policy development. 
In relation to MUP, a broad range of actors have been identified as stakeholders in the policy 
debate. Previous work on media representations of MUP highlights the role of advocates (public 
health groups, health charities and academics) in making supportive statements about the policy in 
media coverage of the debate (14). Support for MUP was also evident among wider policy 
stakeholders including the police and National Health Service (NHS) (15). Previous research on 
alcohol policy, in general, and MUP in particular, has also highlighted the importance of the alcohol 
industry as key influencers (16-19). Direct mechanisms of industry influence include responses to 
consultations, lobbying activities, widespread media presence and legal challenges (16, 19). More 
indirect influence by industry through organisations such as think tanks (18) and charities (17), as 
well as through alliances with consumer/civil society groups and engagement in social responsibility 
activities (19) has also been noted. 
Currently, a nuanced picture of the congruence between actors in the MUP debate is lacking. No 
studies have provided visual representations which reflect the polarisation and configuration of 
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actors and organisations involved in the debate. Consequently, the present article seeks to identify 
the discourse coalitions active in the alcohol policy debate through actors’ use of arguments in print 
media coverage of MUP using the method of discourse network analysis (11, 20). By exploring in 
detail explicit agreement and disagreement between organisations involved in alcohol policy 
development such analyses can provide opportunities for triangulation of existing evidence on policy 
influences, offer new insights on the impact of relationships between actors on stated policy 
positions, and help identify sites for targeted public health advocacy. 
Methods 
Design 
The method of Discourse Network Analysis (DNA), which combines qualitative content analysis with 
network analysis to facilitate the study of policy debates (11, 20), was applied to UK newspaper 
coverage of the development of MUP during a period of intense debate. 
Data 
Eight UK-wide and three Scottish newspapers (and Sunday counterparts) were searched over a 19-
month period, ending in November 2012, for mentions of Alcohol* OR Booze OR Liquor OR Hooch 
[in the headline] AND Price OR Pricing or Tax OR Levy [anywhere in text] using the LexisNexis 
database. The publications were selected to represent three genres of newspaper: ‘serious’/ 
broadsheet, mid-market and tabloid; and a range of readership profiles in relation to age, social class 
and political alignment, as in previous studies (21). A full list of publications is available in the 
supporting information. The search period commenced 1st May 2011, before the formation of an 
SNP majority Scottish Government in the Scottish elections held on 5th May 2011, and ended 30th 
November 2012, after the announcement of the UK Government’s consultation on a 45p MUP for 
alcohol. The period covered was selected to include a peak in reporting on the policy identified by 
Patterson and colleagues (22). The search identified 937 articles. All articles were read to determine 
whether they met the pre-defined inclusion criteria: MUP was the main focus of the article, and the 
article was a news, commentary or feature piece (readers’ letters were excluded). After exclusions, 
348 articles were included. 
Measures 
Using Discourse Network Analyzer (DNA)1, extracts of newspaper text which featured actors’ 
arguments on alcohol consumption and MUP were coded as “statements”. Each statement was 
coded for four variables: individual actor’s name, organisational association of the actor, the 
argument referred to by the actor (henceforth called “concept”), and a dummy variable for 
agreement or disagreement by the actor with the concept. This approach follows that developed by 
Leifeld (20). Since only direct quotes and reported speech from actors in the debate are coded, 
journalistic/editorial comment is not included in the analysis. In total, 1924 statements made by 152 
individuals from 94 organisations, relating to 56 concepts, were coded. Following initial coding, a 
10% sample of articles was coded blind, inconsistencies in coding were discussed and resolved and 
refinements made to some concepts. All articles were recoded applying this final coding framework. 
A table of actors and actor types, and list of concepts are provided in the supporting information. 
                                                          
1 http://www.github.com/leifeld/dna (accessed 14 September 2018). 
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Data Analysis 
DNA was used to convert the structured data into a weighted actor × actor network, where ties and 
their weights represent similarities among actors in terms of agreement and disagreement over 
concepts. The tie weight between any two actors was calculated as the number of different concepts 
they jointly supported or jointly rejected over the course of the 18-month period, minus the number 
of concepts on which the actors had diverging opinions, divided by the average number of 
statements made by both. This is a “subtract” transformation with “average activity normalisation” 
(20). This definition of tie weights measures argumentative similarity in excess of differences of 
opinion and ensures that only argumentative similarity, but not the rate at which actors issue 
statements, is considered for the calculation of tie weights. Negative tie weights represent 
differences in opinion in excess of argumentative similarity, while positive tie weights represent 
similar argumentative positions in excess of differences in opinion, aggregated over all concepts and 
the whole time period. A threshold value of ≥ 0.4 was determined in an exploratory way and applied 
to the resulting network to retain only relatively robust argumentative similarity as ties in the 
network (20). 
The actor network was then imported into the network visualisation software visone to map actors 
and their coalitions visually.2 Actors in the network are represented as nodes and ties (calculated as 
above) are represented by linear connections between nodes. Girvan-Newman edge-betweenness 
community detection – a common graph clustering algorithm (see 23) – was applied to the network 
in order to identify discourse coalitions as cohesive subgroups with similar argumentative patterns. 
The discourse coalitions were highlighted in the network visualisations as blue hyperplanes. 
Different actor types were highlighted using colours, and the statement frequency of each actor was 
visualised as the size of the respective node.  
In order to check for bias inherent in publications chosen, separate networks were created for each 
individual newspaper. Broadly, these showed polarised coalitions in line with the complete network 
(though smaller and hence with less certainty). These networks are available in the supporting 
information. 
Finally, three half-year time slices of the network were created to track changes in the policy debate 
over time. For each time slice, bar plots were created for the concepts to indicate how common and 
how contested each argument was in each phase of the debate. 
Findings 
A range of types of actors were represented in media coverage of the debate. The organisational 
associations of individual actors included political parties, charities, advocacy groups, professional 
associations, think tanks, alcohol manufacturers, retailers and retail associations, and licensed 
traders. All of the types of organisations are represented in the main component of the network. 
Proponents and Opponents 
Two discourse coalitions are evident in the MUP network. Figure 1 shows the coalition of 
proponents of MUP on the right hand side of the network diagram and the coalition of opponents of 
                                                          
2 http://www.visone.info (accessed 14 September 2018). 
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MUP on the left hand side. These discourse coalitions represent similarities among actors in terms of 
co-support or co-rejection of concepts related to MUP. 
[Figure 1 here] 
The “Proponents of MUP” coalition (henceforth referred to as Proponents) includes health charities 
and advocacy groups, five UK and Scottish government and opposition political parties, some alcohol 
manufacturers, some licensed trade representatives, and most academic institutions (see right side 
of Figure 1). Central organisations within this coalition include the SNP and several professional 
associations (Royal College of Physicians, Royal College of Nursing, and British Medical Association). 
These organisations are drawn together by agreement on a range of concept statements relating to 
alcohol problem definition, drivers of alcohol harms and MUP as a potential solution; see Table 1 for 
examples. 
[Table 1 here] 
The “Opponents of MUP” coalition (henceforth referred to as Opponents) consists of some alcohol 
industry manufacturers, most large supermarkets, alcohol trade organisations, economic think 
tanks, some academic institutions, and both Scottish and UK Labour (opposition) parties (see left 
side of Figure 1). Central organisations within this discourse coalition include the Scotch Whisky 
Association and the Wine and Spirit Trade Association. These organisations are drawn together by 
agreement on conceptions of the alcohol problem, ideological opposition to public health 
interventions and criticism of the target population for MUP, and proposal of alternative solutions to 
perceived alcohol problems; see Table 2 for examples.  
[Table 2 here] 
Network and coalition development  
The dynamic nature of policy coalitions is illustrated by comparing Figure 2 (covering the period from 
1 May 2011 to 30 October 2011), Figure 3 (1 November 2011 to 30 April 2012) and Figure 4 (1 May 
2012 to 30 November 2012).  
[Figure 2 here] 
[Figure 3 here] 
[Figure 4 here] 
Figure 2 illustrates the relatively small number of actors engaged in the debate during the earliest 
phase, but indicates clearly the formation of the Proponents and Opponents coalitions. Figure 3 
shows an increased number of actors engaging in the policy debate during the second phase, 
including supermarkets and government advisory bodies. Figure 4 highlights few changes to the 
network structure during the third phase with the exception of the UK Conservatives positon. They 
move from the Proponents to the Opponents coalition. This shift is slight, since the node retains a 
large number of ties across both coalitions, however, this could be an early indication of their future 
U-turn on MUP in the UK context.   
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Bar plots indicating the frequency of concepts referred to, and the frequency of 
agreement/disagreement, during the early, middle and later phases show the change over time in 
the prominence of specific concepts influencing the network.  
[Figure 5] 
[Figure 6] 
[Figure 7] 
Figure 5 shows that between May and October 2011 the most frequently mentioned concept is 
around the necessity of MUP to address the alcohol problem, an argument made most often by 
Proponents. The second most popular concept is “MUP is illegal” an argument which draws together 
the Opponents coalition. The concept which most divided opinion (equivalent levels of agreement 
and disagreement) is the potential for MUP to reduce heavy drinking, reflecting the focus on the 
efficacy of the policy as a targeted population measure. By the middle phase (Figure 6), this concept 
remained a focus of contention. Two further polarising concepts, that responsibility deals with 
industry are ineffective (23 disagree, 22 agree) and that MUP is supported by evidence MUP (17 
disagree, 13 agree) are also evident. By the later phase (Figure 7), legality and efficacy were the top 
divisive concepts.  
Despite a slight shift in organisational positions within the network, insights from the argumentation 
of the debate suggest the key issues during the period remained relatively consistent, with increased 
division based on perspectives on responsibility deals and the evidence base for MUP evident in the 
middle phase.  
Political parties and coalition centrality 
Figure 1 shows the centrality of political parties as key nodes linking the Opponents and Proponents 
coalitions. Table 3 provides a count of each political party’s total ties in the network, the number of 
these ties that exist within their primary cluster, and a resultant measure that captures the ratio of 
cluster-external ties over all ties of a given actor (“external ratio”). 
[Table 3 here] 
The higher the external ratio score, the less central and embedded the party is within its respective 
coalition. As illustrated in Figure 1, the Conservatives, Labour and Scottish Conservatives nodes 
operate across the coalitions, with links to both Proponents and Opponents, making their scores 
relatively high. In contrast, the SNP score of 0.00 reflects the centrality of the party within the 
Proponents coalition, with no links to organisations outside of the coalition. Scottish Labour also has 
a low score, since it is embedded within the Opponents coalition. The Liberal Democrats and Scottish 
Liberal Democrats have low external ratio scores indicating their embeddedness within the 
Proponents coalition. None of the political parties inhabit positions at the outer edges of the 
network or their respective coalitions, rather they are either central to the network or to a particular 
coalition. The high external ratio score of the UK Conservative party reflects the number of individual 
politicians who voiced opposing perspectives on MUP in the media over the course of the debate.  
This can be further explored through visualisation of the network at individual actor, rather than 
organisational, level. 
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[Figure 8 here] 
Figure 8 shows the opposing positions taken up by prominent Conservative UK government 
politicians in the debate on MUP. David Cameron (Prime Minister), Theresa May (Home Office) and 
Jeremy Hunt (Culture, Media and Sport, then Health) are all central actors in the Proponents 
coalition. Andrew Lansley (Health), Michael Gove (Education) and David Willets (Universities) are 
central to the Opponents coalition. Liberal Democrat politicians are also split across the coalitions; 
however, the two Scottish Liberal Democrats in the network (Willie Rennie – Leader, and Alison 
McInnes – Health spokesperson) are both in the Proponents coalition. Labour politicians are also 
split, with two in the Opponents coalition, and several in the Proponents coalition (including the 
leader – Ed Miliband). The majority of Scottish Labour politicians are in the Opponents coalition 
reflecting their position in opposition to the SNP in the Scottish Parliament. SNP politicians in Figure 
2 are all situated in the Proponents coalition. 
Commercial organisations 
Figure 1 illustrates both cooperation and divergence among industry organisations involved in the 
MUP debate. Prominent central nodes in the Opponents coalition are the Wine and Spirit Trade 
Association and the Scotch Whisky Association appearing largest because they were most active in 
the coalition. The size and position of these nodes suggest their leadership within the Opponents. 
Amongst alcohol producers, Tennant’s is the sole manufacturer to be positioned within the 
Proponents coalition, with SAB Miller, Diageo and Heineken centrally positioned within the 
Opponents coalition. Tennant’s, however, like Carlsberg UK, is very much on the periphery of the 
network, having made few statements in agreement with other organisations. The Licensed Trade 
organisations are also dispersed between the coalitions, with the Scottish Licensed Trade Association 
and Greene King positioned within the Proponents coalition and JD Wetherspoon within the 
Opponents coalition. Retailers are also dispersed, with Tesco positioned on the periphery of the 
Proponents coalition and Sainsbury’s, Asda and Morrisons within the Opponents, alongside the 
British Retailers Consortium and Scottish Grocers Federation. This dispersal suggests a lack of co-
agreement or co-disagreement amongst commercial organisations in their statements on MUP. 
Think tanks and charity organisations 
The majority of the charities included in the network, e.g., Alcohol Concern, Alcohol Focus Scotland, 
are positioned centrally in the Proponents coalition with no ties to organisations in the Opponents 
Coalition. A charity which has previously received alcohol funding, Addaction (17), is also situated in 
the Proponents coalition, although more peripherally. Drinkaware, which is 96% funded by major UK 
alcohol producers, pub operators, restaurants, major supermarkets and other retailers (24), is also 
situated in the Proponents coalition; however, most of its ties are to commercial organisations, 
albeit those which are supportive of, or ambivalent about, the idea of MUP. Certain think tanks (i.e. 
Adam Smith Institute, Centre for Economics and Business Research and Institute for Economic 
Affairs) are located in the Opponents coalition along with alcohol manufacturers and retail 
associations, suggesting consistent alignment of the positions articulated by these groups on key 
concepts used by opponents of MUP. 
Academic organisations 
Most academic organisations in the network feature in the Proponents coalition, including the two 
largest academic contributors to the debate, the University of Sheffield and Newcastle University, 
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closely aligned with advocacy groups, alcohol-related health charities and the SNP. Two universities 
are positioned peripherally to the network or within the Opponents coalition, Glasgow Caledonian 
University and Birmingham University respectively. In both cases this reflects academic actors, with 
an interest in Public Health, offering critical perspectives on MUP, for example highlighting potential 
unintended consequences for alcohol dependent individuals, such as increased drug taking or 
criminal activities (Glasgow Caledonian University, 13th December 2011, The Times). In addition, 
individual academics from Glasgow Caledonian University with expertise in Business Studies and 
Philosophy commented on the policy from disciplinary perspectives outside of Public Health, in one 
instance citing application of JS Mill’s harm principle as a litmus test for the appropriateness of laws 
governing individuals’ behaviour (Glasgow Caledonian University, 3rd December 2011, The Sunday 
Times). Expression of such perspectives creates alignment with evidence producers in economic 
think tanks, rather than Public Health academic colleagues. 
 
European actors 
A tightly linked portion of the Opponents coalition contains those European actors whose 
contributions to the debate were focused on the legality of MUP. Several wine producing nations 
who entered objections, the EU commission, the Law Society, the European Spirits Organisation, as 
well as the Scottish Labour party are drawn together by general agreement that the policy was illegal 
or questionable. 
Discussion 
In accordance with previous research on media representations of MUP, which suggests 
stakeholders were represented as either advocates or critics of the policy (14), our study shows two 
polarised discourse coalitions emerged over the course of the debate drawn together by co-
agreement and co-disagreement over conceptualisations of the alcohol problem, and responses to 
MUP as a potential solution. By offering a visual representations of the network of UK stakeholders 
engaged in the MUP debate, our study illustrates how actors cluster according to stated preferences 
about the policy, and provides key insights into the discursive relations of political actors, industry 
organisations and other key stakeholders in the debate. 
The political context in which MUP was conceived and debated has been cited as an important 
influence on the fate of the policy proposal. The election of an SNP administration, which was less 
well acquainted with alcohol industry actors, has been seen as initiating renewed Scottish 
government engagement with lobbyists from the alcohol industry and public health on equal terms, 
to end a period of relative inactivity in relation to alcohol policy (8). Early enthusiasm for MUP in the 
Scottish context has been explained by Katikireddi and colleagues as resultant from a range of 
contextual influences, including desire from the SNP government to emulate the success of the 
smoke-free legislation and follow an agenda distinct to Westminster (7). The devolved 
administration’s pursuit of MUP also seems to have been an influential factor in the UK 
Government’s period of support for the policy (8). Political context, however, seemed also influential 
in its eventual abandonment. Conservative political manoeuvrings in advance of the Scottish 
Independence Referendum and the 2015 General Election have been cited as key determinants of 
the shelving of MUP at Westminster (25). These issues of political context resonate with the 
structure of the network produced in this study. While the UK Conservative party is a central node 
within the complete MUP network with links to both the Opponents and Proponents coalitions, the 
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SNP node is embedded centrally within the Proponents coalition. This difference in positioning 
between the two parties in government at the time perhaps reflects the differing political contexts 
and in particular the distinctive Scottish policy context, where channels of communication between 
policymakers and health advocates have been characterised as more open and relationships with 
industry representatives less well-established (7, 8). 
Often in policy networks, politicians and political parties are positioned centrally, operating at the 
interface between two opposing discourse coalitions (26, 27). In keeping with this convention, the 
UK Conservative party node inhabits a central position in the MUP network. However, this does not 
reflect a brokering role in relation to the development of MUP, but highlights disagreement within 
the party. Mapping the development of alcohol policy in England and Wales, Nicholls and 
Greenaway point to both “ideological” and “systemic” tensions in the emergence of MUP (28). They 
cite ideological tensions within the coalition government between libertarian and paternalistic 
perspectives throughout the MUP debate and identify that support for MUP within the coalition 
seemed bound by shifts in focus between departments and actors. Figure 8, the network of 
politicians, illustrates these ideological tensions and departmental shifts, with a key triad of UK 
Conservatives embedded within the Opponents coalition. Due to the relatively short nature of the 
time period studied, further shifts in position, both within the Home Office and from the Prime 
Minister, are not captured in the current analysis. 
Our analysis provides insights into the dispersal of alcohol manufacturers, retailers and trade 
associations across both discourse coalitions. Unlike analyses of tobacco policy networks which 
present starkly polarised coalitions, containing clusters of homogeneous actors – either tobacco 
manufacturers or health-related organisations (29), the MUP network shows the distribution of 
industry organisations across two opposing discourse coalitions, confirming previously identified 
divergence amongst alcohol-related industry actors on MUP. Holden and colleagues suggest the 
alcohol industry is not a homogenous entity and adopts different positions on a range of policy 
issues, including MUP (30). Spirits producers, which are largely export focussed, but dependent on 
the off-trade for domestic sales, were the most vehemently opposed to MUP. The Scotch Whisky 
Association, identified as symbolic and strategic leaders of the anti-legislation campaign (8), appear 
centrally in the Opponents coalition. On-trade actors, unaffected by possible prices rises and 
potential beneficiaries of increased off-sale prices, were more sympathetic to the policy, reflected in 
the position of the Scottish Licensed Trade Association in the network. Other sectors (e.g. beer 
producers and supermarkets), as evident in in Figure 1, were more divided and the positions 
adopted varied at company rather than sectoral level. In all cases, those commercial organisations 
opposed to MUP were more vehement in their stance than those in favour, reflected in the larger 
size of commercial Opponent nodes in the network. 
The MUP network highlights the similarities which exist between the positions articulated by free 
market think tanks and industry actors opposed to the legislation (the Wine and Spirit Trade 
Association, the Scotch Whisky Association and Diageo) at the centre of the Opponents coalition. 
Hawkins and McCambridge have described previously strategic funding of certain think tank reports 
by alcohol manufactures which were heavily cited in the lead up to the UK government's 2012 
alcohol strategy (18). While neither formal nor financial relationships between think tanks and 
alcohol manufacturers are identified here, the clustering evident within the Opponents network 
reflects consistent co-agreement and co-disagreement with leading industry opponents of MUP. The 
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network also suggests that some of the charity organisations which have been identified as 
recipients of alcohol industry funding (17, 31) were less centrally embedded within the Opponents 
coalition than might have been expected. Addaction is positioned within the Proponents coalition 
and the wholly industry-funded Drinkaware appears in a relatively neutral position on the periphery 
of the Proponents coalition, although with most links to industry organisations with a favourable, or 
potentially neutral, stance on MUP.  
Conclusion 
Our analysis provides visual evidence of the network of stakeholders engaged in the debate on the 
policy of MUP to address UK alcohol consumption as portrayed in the newsprint media. The method 
of DNA shows much promise for extension to further our understandings of public health policy 
development. The current study draws on media coverage as the sole source of data, and as such 
the network produced reflects public narratives offered by actors engaged in the debate. 
Triangulating the method with other methods or with other data sources could further increase the 
scope of similar studies in future. Currently, our visualisations do not highlight how the positions of 
actors evolved beyond November 2012. We cannot provide MUP network insights on the 
observations of other commentators that key political events, such as preparation for the 2015 
General Election or the economic concerns of the Regulatory Policy Committee, were instrumental 
in the UK Government’s abandonment of MUP (25). The temporal focus also prohibits exploration of 
stakeholders’ perspectives during the period of legal challenges by the Scotch Whisky Association 
ending in November 2017. Future research could employ theoretically informed time-series analysis 
over longer periods to highlight how shifts in influential actors’ rhetoric, and positions, precede or 
follow key announcements about policy direction.  
Illustration of co-agreement and co-disagreement between actors in favour and against MUP has 
confirmed existing evidence on the development of MUP policy in relation to political context and 
provided empirical evidence of some limitations of industry influence, particularly in relation to 
charity organisations. The findings also suggest sites for targeted public health advocacy, and 
confirm the potential of applying the method of DNA to contemporary policy debates in order to 
support identification of policy actors and organisations with an appetite for dialogue with public 
health organisations and active engagement with sources of public health evidence. 
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Table 1: Concepts shared by Proponents 
Concept Example of statement 
Government action is 
needed on alcohol 
consumption 
“The government's ongoing failure to tackle the root causes of alcohol 
misuse means we will see hospital admissions continue to rise in the 
future.” Don Shenker (Alcohol Concern), 26th May 2011, Guardian. 
Commercial interests 
should be limited to 
protect public health 
 
“In challenging the implementation of minimum pricing, the Scotch 
Whisky Association is essentially arguing that the commercial interests of 
its members should take precedence over the health and wellbeing of 
the people of Scotland. We need to decide if our society is prepared to 
limit commercial activity to better protect our health and quality of life, 
or alternatively, allow powerful corporate interests to dictate health 
policy.” Evelyn Gillan (Alcohol Focus Scotland) 26th October 2012, 
Guardian. 
MUP needed to 
reduce health 
harms/deaths related 
to alcohol 
“Minimum pricing will reduce the harm caused by alcohol misuse and we 
believe the policy, agreed by Parliament and backed by expert opinion, is 
the most effective pricing measure and it will save lives.” Alex Neil (SNP), 
29th December 2012, Daily Record. 
 
Table 1: Concepts shared by Opponents 
Concept  Instance 
Alcohol related harm 
is falling/stabilising 
“It is surprising that hospital admissions have apparently doubled over a 
period in which alcohol consumption has significantly declined. If the 
hospital admissions data are robust, they clearly put paid to the 
argument that measures to reduce overall alcohol consumption are 
effective in reducing harm.” David Poley (Portman Group), 27th May 
2011, Daily Mail. 
Government action on 
public health is 
unnecessary 
"It's regressive and paternalistic, treating people as if they're children to 
be nannied by the Government." Sam Bowman (Adam Smith Institute), 
Independent.co.uk, 14th May 2012. 
MUP is an unfair cost 
to consumer and will 
penalise responsible 
drinkers 
 “It [MUP] is more likely to have a bigger proportionate impact on 
responsible drinkers who happen to be in low-income households”. 
Andrew Lansley (Health Secretary, Conservative), 18th December 2011, 
Independent. 
Responsibility deals 
with industry are 
effective 
“We have also had significant success with community alcohol 
partnerships aimed at combating under-age drinking; the Responsibility 
Deal is taking a billion units of alcohol out of the market”. Gavin 
Partington (Wine and Spirit Trade Association), 30th March 2012, The 
Times. 
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Table 2: Political party ties 
Party Total ties Ties within cluster External ratio 
Conservatives 33 20 0.39 
Labour 24 17 0.29 
Liberal Democrats 19 18 0.05 
SNP 24 24 0.00 
Scottish Labour 19 18 0.05 
Scottish Conservatives 24 13 0.46 
Scottish Liberal Democrats 19 18 0.05 
 
 
